Animal Law, in its progressive form, seeks to challenge the anthropocentrism of the law affecting the interests of animals, reflected most clearly in the animal welfare model of animal protection. This model takes an instrumental view of non-human animals, with domesticated animals categorised as property and animal interests almost always giving way to competing human interests. Animal Law also critically examines, in a less convincing way, regulation of the interests of wild animals. With a philosophical focus on the inherent worth of animals and a commitment to advocacy for practical regulatory reform, Animal Law should enjoy a close affinity with Wild Law, given its alogous focus on the inherent worth of ture and a commitment to reform recognising the reciprocal relationship between humans and ture. This chapter explores shared concerns and potential areas of collaboration between Animal Law and Wild Law, as well as highlighting potential tensions. If, as Dale Jamieson has argued, an animal liberation ethic is also an environmental ethic, can it similarly be argued that an 'Animal Jurisprudence' is also an Earth Jurisprudence?
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