tural property rights are widely viewed as athema to welfarist taxation, and are pictured as non-contextual, non-relatiol and resistant to regulation. Here, I argue that many of the major arguments for such views are flawed. Such arguments trade on an ambiguity in the term 'right' that makes it possible to conflate the core concept of a right with a situated or specified right from which one can read off people's actual legal entitlements and duties. I marshal several arguments demonstrating this conflation. In particular, I examine the right to free speech, where contextualization and responsiveness to the requirements of other rights are assumed as a matter of course. I conclude that the existence of one tural right does not foreclose the existence of other tural rights. Arguments for or against welfare rights must be assessed, at least to some extent, independently of the assertion of a tural property right.
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