Adaptive preferences are preferences formed in response to circumstances and opportunities - paradigmatically, they occur when we scale back our desires so they accord with what is probable or at least possible. While few commentators are willing to wholly reject the normative significance of such preferences, adaptive preferences have nevertheless attracted substantial criticism in recent political theory. The groundbreaking alysis of Jon Elster charged that such preferences are not autonomous, and several other commentators have since followed Elster's lead. On a second front, Capability Theorists Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen have objected that adaptive preferences lead people away from objective goods and constitute an impediment to progressive change in developing countries. In this paper I argue that the criticisms of Elster, Sen and Nussbaum fail on the one hand to take into account what may be positively said in favour of this type of preference formation, and fail on the other hand to distinguish between different types of psychological changes - with the result that many of the critiques offered have a rrower purview than is currently allowed. My alysis of adaptive preferences, even in their most ideal form, is however not entirely positive; I adduce reasons why we can be cautious about allowing adaptive preferences to play certain types of roles in political processes, even as we accept those very preferences as normative and autonomous for the agent holding them. [Intertiol scholars without access to the AJPAE are invited to email firstname.lastname@example.org for a pdf copy of this article.]
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